There have been 4½ proposed Covenants:
Proposals for an Anglican Covenant in Appendix 2 of the Windsor Report (2005)
The Nassau Draft (2007)
The St Andrew's Draft (2008)
The Ridley-Cambridge Draft (2009)
(the half) The Ridley-Cambridge Draft amended by a committee set up by the Anglican Consultative Council (2009). This is the final text, which provinces are now being asked to sign.
The main problem facing the Covenant Design Group was constitutional. Firstly, how could a new central competence be created which would have effective power over the bodies which created it? Secondly, who would be the new central body? Thirdly, what powers would this central body have? The starting and persistent difficulty has always been that each member Province highly prizes its autonomy and would resent anything which appeared to be interfering with its sovereign competence to govern its own affairs.
A second rumbling difficulty has been the place that some provinces have within the legal structures of the countries they are based in. Hong Kong, the Churches of North and South India, and England at least, would all find it legally impossible to become a subordinate part of a larger, international body.
Every draft has attempted to square this circle: how to give the Covenant real powers to instruct provinces and threaten punishment to the disobedient, while at the same time making it attractive enough for provinces to sign it. The story of the various attempts is told here.
The Nassau Draft
In the Nassau draft there was but one use of the word 'autonomy' (§6.1) in which Provinces promised to exercise their autonomy with 'regard to the common good of the Communion'. This was too vague. It might mean subordination (if, for example, the Primates had already decided what the common good was in specific circumstances) or it could imply a token consideration within independent decision making.
Signatories would have agreed to 'spend time with openness and patience in matters of theological debate and discernment to listen and to study with one another in order to comprehend the will of God' (§6.2), 'to seek ... a common mind about matters of essential concern' (§6.3), 'to heed the counsel of our Instruments of Communion in matters which threaten the unity of the Communion and the effectiveness of our mission' (§6.3), and 'to seek the guidance of the Instruments of Communion, where there are matters in serious dispute among churches' (§6.4). The Primates would be empowered to issue 'guidance and direction' as to the substance of the 'common mind' of the Communion (§6.5).
In summary: the covenanting churches and the international organs of the Communion would discuss and debate an issue for as long as necessary to come to a common mind. The Primates would then decide just what that common mind was: their decision would thus end debate on something so serious and divisive that there was no common mind across the Communion.
Furthermore, and this is the fiction designed to hold autonomy and central control together:
We acknowledge that in the most extreme circumstances, where member churches choose not to fulfil the substance of the covenant as understood by the Councils of the Instruments of Communion, we will consider that such churches will have relinquished for themselves the force and meaning of the covenant's purpose, and a process of restoration and renewal will be required to re-establish their covenant relationship with other member churches (§6.6).
No autonomy would be breached if the Province removed itself from the Communion. Each member could still make its own sovereign decisions about any matter within its jurisdiction. There were no sanctions. However each Province would act in the awareness of what later became called the 'relational consequences' of its actions. No Province would be told what to do but all the rest of the Provinces retained the right to turn their backs on the offender. In effect this would suggest that, behind the legal face of respect for autonomy, the central bodies would govern by threat and blackmail: 'if you do that we're not going to talk to you again'.
The St Andrew's Draft
The St Andrews' Draft was a significant improvement on its predecessor in its structure and wording. Its three sections (Our Inheritance of Faith, The Life We Share with Others: Our Anglican Vocation, Our Unity and Common Life) were set out in a pattern of affirmations and consequent commitments.
The affirmations in Section 3 Our Unity and Common Life built on the first three paragraphs of the Nassau Draft. It stated:
Each Church, episcopally led and synodically governed, orders and regulates its own affairs and its local responsibility for mission through its own system of government and law and is therefore described as autonomous-in-communion. Churches of the Anglican Communion are not bound together by a central legislative, executive or judicial authority (§3.1.2).
This is a stronger statement of provincial autonomy even if the hyphenation 'autonomous-in-communion' seems to qualify autonomy more than a phrase like 'autonomous and in communion' might imply.
§3.2 set out the commitments that were expected to follow from being autonomous-in-communion. These largely repeated those of the Nassau Draft not least in its emphasis on the 'common mind' as the goal of discussion and the end of debate. There was a welcome recognition that 'Some issues, which are perceived as controversial or new when they arise, may well evoke a deeper understanding of the implications of God's revelation to us', alongside issues potentially destructive of faith.
The proposed mechanisms by which disputed matters could be addressed formally by the international structures of Anglicanism were set out in some detail in an Appendix: Framework Procedures for the resolution of Covenant disagreements published with the St Andrew's Draft. This shed significant light on a central opacity of the previous Draft but was a political hostage to fortune as the process and its juridical character were attacked, notwithstanding that it had been described as a 'tentative draft'. (The authors of the final version of the Covenant have reverted to opacity.)
The procedures envisaged had several advantages over the Nassau Draft proposal to constitute the Primates as the final court of arbitration. More of the international structures of Anglicanism were engaged. The possibility of arbitration was introduced. This may have been of pragmatic value though it is conceptually difficult to reconcile arbitration with ideas of truth or a common mind. Clear timetables were also given. The language was also moderated to take into account sensitivities around autonomy: instead of the Primates being able to issue 'guidance and direction' the covenanters pledged themselves in advance to 'receive from the Instruments of Communion a request to adopt a particular course of action in respect of the matter under dispute' (§3.2.5.d).
However the apparent inflexibility and juridical character of the process (with echoes of the procedure of the Court of Ecclesiastical Causes Reserved which, though a dead letter, still sits on the statute book of the Church of England as the final court of appeal in doctrinal disputes) were not improvements. Nor was there any clarity as to who was to be responsible for running the process. And a request backed by the threat of sanctions is still an instruction.
Once again the same fiction was offered to square the circle of autonomy and central decision making:
commitment to this covenant entails an acknowledgement that in the most extreme circumstances, where a Church chooses not to adopt the request of the Instruments of Communion, that decision may be understood by the Church itself, or by the resolution of the Instruments of Communion, as a relinquishment by that Church of the force and meaning of the covenant's purpose, until they re-establish their covenant relationship with other member Churches. (§3.2.5.e)
A new central competence with effective power has to begin at the most extreme possibility, in this case the possibility of expulsion from the community. All lesser powers ('relational consequences') of any new structure are derived from its ultimate power. Therefore the future Communion envisaged in the Covenant is one grounded on the presupposition that it may expel its members; it will remain a fragile Communion until its authority is actually demonstrated by the expulsion of a member.
The Ridley-Cambridge Draft
The Ridley-Cambridge Draft was less prescriptive, proposing that each member Church set up 'mechanisms, agencies or institutions' (§4.2.6) consistent with its own structures. The agent in each Province will co-ordinate its response to international process begun under the Covenant. At best this should function as a conflict prevention mechanism, forewarning of potential difficulties and addressing them before they become irresolvable. At worst they will enable the central bodies to peer further and further into the internal workings of a province.
The Ridley-Cambridge Draft again struggled with questions of enforcement of the Covenant and the autonomy of its members. Again it stepped closer to asserting the autonomy of signatories in the face of its own desire to control them. In its text each member Church declares
its resolve to live in a Communion of Churches. Each Church, with its bishops in synod, orders and regulates its own affairs and its local responsibility for mission through its own system of government and law and is therefore described as living "in communion with autonomy and accountability". Trusting in the Holy Spirit, who calls and enables us to dwell in a shared life of common worship and prayer for one another, in mutual affection, commitment and service, we seek to affirm our common life through those Instruments of Communion by which our Churches are enabled to be conformed together to the mind of Christ. Churches of the Anglican Communion are bound together "not by a central legislative and executive authority, but by mutual loyalty sustained through the common counsel of the bishops in conference" and of the other instruments of Communion (§3.1.2).
It recognised, for the first time, that
The life of communion includes an ongoing engagement with the diverse expressions of apostolic authority, from synods and episcopal councils to local witness, in a way which continually interprets and articulates the common faith of the Church's members (consensus fidelium) (§3.1.4).
This is the first acknowledgement of the complexity of faithful religious life in the Covenant which holds the possibility that differing, even conflicting, 'expressions of apostolic authority' may be valid. The sentence continues to presume a single, unitary 'common faith' in defiance of, for example, the disagreements which brought the Anglican Communion to its present crisis. Furthermore, in apparently equating 'the common faith of the Church's members' with the consensus fidelium it ignores the significance of the reception of faith in the life of the church.
This tentative opening to complexity is ascribed to structural levels below that of the Province, raising the question of the relationship between Covenant and Province when it comes to activities in part of a province or not approved by provincial authority. It is not clear whether the plea that a provincial body cannot be held responsible for all the activities of its constituent parts will shield it from the mechanisms of the Covenant. Some provinces have a high degree of control over dioceses and other bodies; other provinces have very little. The logic of the Covenant mechanisms (both conflict resolution and conflict prevention) is that, over time and against all protestations of provincial autonomy, they will reach ever further into the internal organs of a province, into their constitutional arrangements, and into more subjects of possible contention at ever-earlier stages.
In the implementation of the Covenant it repeats the earlier emphasis on the need for consultation and loyal, mutual regard in the search for a shared mind (no longer a common mind) in the discernment of developments in the life of the church. But, as with each of the previous drafts, the Ridley-Cambridge Draft hits the rocks when it comes to questions of powers.
The Ridley-Cambridge Draft makes clear what was implicit from the start. Signing the Covenant will, in future, constitute the Anglican Communion and will replace whatever formal ties bound Provinces together in the past:
Participation in the covenant expresses a loyalty grounded in mutuality that one Church freely offers to other Churches, in whom it recognises the bonds of a common faith and order, a common inheritance in worship, life and mission, and a readiness to live in an interdependent life, but does not represent submission to any external ecclesiastical jurisdiction (§4.1.1).
This is a unity of mutual recognition but its constituent members do not accept that any other member or international entity has power over them (§4.1.3). The basis of mutual recognition is that all members have formally assented to the propositions in parts 1-3 of the Covenant 'as fundamental to the life of the Anglican Communion and to the relationships among the covenanting Churches.' (§4.1.2). The voluntary acceptance of this confessional statement has no jurisdictional consequence except that each signatory should maintain fidelity to this Anglican Confession (§4.1.3).
There is a presupposition of continued consultation and debate in the search for a 'shared mind' and the discernment of a deeper understanding of God's calling to the Church. Each member agrees 'to act with diligence, care and caution in respect of any action which may provoke controversy ...' (3.2.5) and, if conflict should break out, to accept mediation (3.2.6).
But any derogation from the Anglican Confession will have consequences. The Standing Committee of the Anglican Communion (SCAC) 'shall have the duty of overseeing the functioning of the Covenant' (§4.2.1). Where a question is raised as to possible action which may or may not be in accord with the terms of the Covenant the church concerned may first be asked to delay until further soundings have been made (§4.2.3). (There seems to be some ambiguity as to the relationship between mediate and delay.)
If the Church refuses to delay (§4.2.3), or if the ACC or Primates' Meeting advises that the proposed action is 'incompatible with the Covenant' (§4.2.4), the SCAC 'may make recommendations as to relational consequences' (§4.2.5). Relational consequences are punishments by another name - requests to withdraw from some, many or all of the various networks, ministries and instruments of the Anglican Communion co-ordinated with requests to other members to consider withdrawal of co-operation with the offending Church. Ultimately (§4.3.1) a Church may withdraw itself from the Covenant.
Thus is the circle squared once again. To be a member of the Anglican Communion is to voluntarily sign the Covenant. Thereafter each member of the Anglican Communion may do its own thing so long as no other member suspects or believes its actions to be outwith the Confessional sections of the Covenant. If a dispute does blow up the mechanism are in place to marginalise and exclude.
The final text
The Ridley-Cambridge Draft was put to the ACC 14 (Jamaica, May 2009) which accepted the proposal except for its final section. The stated reason was that this section had had insufficient consultation despite the fact that it and its precursors had been the primary focus of attention since the idea of a Covenant was first mooted. They received a further 18 responses, and 3 after the deadline, out of 39 possible contributors. The effect of their amendments appear to be fairly minor. (See the Commentary)
The opening paragraph of this section (§4.1.1) has been rewritten in a more dynamic tone, speaking of churches growing 'more fully into the ecclesial communion' and describing the Anglican Communion as a 'fellowship' whose members recognise in one another 'a common loyalty to Christ.' rather that the implicit common loyalty to the Covenant of the earlier draft.
§4.2.3 of the final draft is new. It makes clear that matters should be referred to the SCAC only after the earlier requirements for debate and, if necessary, mediation have been exhausted and no 'shared mind' has been attained. It does not specify who should be responsible for this earlier stage, or pay for it, but presumably the member provinces themselves will have to make their own arrangements. When the SCAC becomes involved its first task is to repeat the search for agreement, taking advice from elsewhere including, where appropriate, both the ACC and the Primates' Meeting (§4.2.4).