A Reflection on Greenbelt
September 11, 2024Watch Back: Christianity and the Far Right – Panel with Helen Paynter, Maria Power and Raj Bharat Patta
October 4, 2024The Little Black Book of the Populist Right
By Jon Bloomfield and David Edgar
By-line Books, 2024
Book Review by Dr Joseph Forde
What are the causes of the rise of national populism in Europe, America and beyond, in the 2010s and 2020s? What are the issues that have had the most appeal to national populist voters? How important has the decline of social democratic parties across Europe been for the rise of national populism? Has national populism redrawn the ideological fault lines of politics, and, if so, in what ways?
For liberal Christians who want answers to these questions (and many others relating to the rise of national populism), this is an excellent book that ― in my opinion ― goes some way to providing them. It has been written by two experts working in the field of political science who have a wealth of knowledge and expertise to draw on, and in an accessible style that covers a lot of ground in a modest number of words.
Common characteristics are identified as being germane to the national populist right: ‘nationalism, xenophobia, glorification of an idealised national culture, an identified threat from an excluded “other”, an anti-global conspiracy theory, and a charismatic leader’ being some to watch out for. The authors do, however, identify key differences between the national populists and fascists. For example, the latter’s deployment of militaristic solutions as a way of advancing their cause hasn’t yet featured in the rise of national populism in the 21st century. That said, some might say that the insurrection in America on 6th January 2021 came pretty close, and there is a growing number of armed groups in America who support the rise of Donald Trump’s version of national populism.
The book is particularly strong in the way it locates the rise of national populism as being ― at least in part ― a reaction against the neo-liberal, economic paradigm that had dominated western politics from the mid-1970s until the economic crash of 2007/8. That was a period of history when deregulation of markets had become de rigueur in conservative (and some social democratic) political circles; when transnational bodies such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank had assumed greater levels of influence on shaping world economic affairs; when freedom of movement across nation state borders was seen as conducive (if not essential) for achieving economic growth on a large scale; when ‘trickle-down’ economics was seen by many as a way of benefiting everyone (‘a rising tide lifts all boats’) despite a growing body of evidence to the contrary, resulting in a stinging critique of this thinking by Pope Francis in his seminal apostolic exhortation of 2013, Evangelii Gaudium; and when globalisation was seen by neo-liberal advocates as preferable to nationally defined economic and cultural legacies and practices. Then came the economic crash of 2007/8, and confidence in the neoliberal economic and political paradigm was dented.
For some conservative thinkers (and ‘blue socialist’ thinkers such as Maurice Glasman), freedom of movement was now seen as having led to excessive migration at the expense of the economic and social wellbeing of native populations; support for multiculturalism was seen by them as having led to ethnically defined segregation within sections of the population (with immigrants allegedly living parallel lives to those of the native population). Old style manufacturing production had gone into rapid decline as the computer IT revolution transformed labour markets and cut across nationally defined borders, and the traditional working classes in the shipyards, car plants, pits, factories and dockyards had become ‘left behind’ and were bitter as a result. By contrast, the national populists promoted the idea that ―under neo-liberalism ― the big city fat cat elites had prospered at the expense of them, in alliance with a state that had become deep and corrupted. A politics of working class grievance was around the corner, and quickly became aligned with movements like Trumpism in America and Brexit in the U.K.
In recent years, national populists such as Giorgia Meloni, Marine Le Pen and Viktor Orbán have harped back to an age when conservatism had been different to classical liberalism (and the neo-liberalism of the kind that Thatcherism/ Reaganism/Macronism had embraced). From their perspective, a new national conservatism is now needed, spearheaded by a national, populist movement that can harness the support of the ‘forgotten men and women’, who are victims of an increasingly post-industrial age, by enabling them to get their country back and make it great again. It will do this by closing off national borders to migrants (or at least considerably restricting their numbers), and by ‘levelling up’ national economies, so as to channel more money into the towns that have been left behind. Thus, active state intervention in the economy is back in vogue in some national populist circles, as a way of mitigating the worst aspects of neoliberalism’s laissez-faire market abuses. Crucially, national populists advocate withdrawing from transnational organisations that threaten the national economic, political and legal sovereignty of nation states. Thus, for these authors, the origins and causes of Brexit ― at least to some extent ― can be seen in that light, as can the rise of American isolationism that has been championed by Donald Trump.
Bloomfield and Edgar’s exposition and analysis of these events is illuminating on many levels, and offers a well-argued and informed perspective on their political and economic origins and causes. At a time when slogans such as ‘Family, Faith and Flag’ ― the origins of which can be traced back to the propaganda used by supporters of Mussolini’s rise in Italy in the 1920s― have reappeared in support of national populist (and blue socialist) movements across Europe, this is surely a moment in history when liberal Christians need to reflect on the dangers this movement poses to liberal democracy as we have come to know it.
Dr Joseph Forde is Honorary Research Fellow in Historical Theology at the Urban Theology Union, Sheffield, UK, and is the author of: ‘Before and Beyond the ‘Big Society’: John Milbank and the Church of England’s Approach to Welfare (Cambridge: James Clarke & Co. 2022).
Modern Church will be hosting an online discussion panel at 7 – 8.30pm on Wednesday 2nd October, 2024, exploring the rise of national populism and the Far-Right. Event details are here. Join us on Youtube for the livestream.